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The conclusion to be drawn from these observations is that,
when comprehensive standards are laid down by the legislature by
which the board is to be bound and mere details are left to the
administrative body or officer, the power delegated is purely administrative. Where the standards are unrestricted or omitted the
power becomes legislative. Between these two extremes we have
a "twilight zone" within which each case must be determined on
its own facts.
It would seem that the delegation in the present case is a
mere reiteration of what the legislature has done many times before
and clearly within constitutional bounds.
E. E. T., JR.

CONSTTTONAL

L.&w-fDuE
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FAULT. - P was injured while working for D, who had not sub-

scribed to the workmen's compensation fund. P sued D for the
damages incurred under an amended section of the act" which imposed an enforceable liability upon a non-casual, nonsubseribing
employer for injuries suffered in the course of and resulting from
employment, though not caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of the employer. Held, one judge dissenting, that the statute
is unconstitutional as violative of the due process clauses of the
state
and federal constitutions. Pragerv. W. R. C-hapman & Sons
2
Co.

Though the constitutionality of workmen's compensation acts
is now generally conceded, 3 at their inception the declaration that
an employer, even under the act, should be responsible for injuries
to his workmen whether or not the employer was at fault met with
instant and vigorous opposition. While it was held that the com1 W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) e. 23, art. 2, § 8. 11... employers ... shall
be liable to their employees ... for all damages suffered by reason of accidental
personal injuries or accidental death sustained in the course of and resulting

from their employment, and in any action by any such employee or personal
representative thereof, such defendant shall not avail himself of the following
common law defenses: The defense of the fellow-servant rule; the defense of
the assumption of risk; or the defense of contributory negligence; and further,
shall not avail himself of any defense that the negligence in question was that
of someone whose duties are prescribed by statute, provided no action shall lie,
and no recovery shall be had, against casual employers .. .without allegation
and proof that such accidental personal injuries ... were caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of the employer...."
2 9 S. E. (2d) 880 (W. Va. 1940).
3 Do Francesco v. Piney Mining Co., 76 W. Va. 756, 86 S. B. 777 (1915) ; 1
SOHNEIDER, WoRm's CounPmATIo" L.aw (2d ed. 1932) § 4.
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mon-law defenses of the fellow-servant rule, contributory negligence and assumption of risk were within the legislative power and
could be abolished, the courts still clung tenaciously to the belief
that no man could be made liable without fault, and any attempt
so to abrogate this doctrine was viewed as an infringement of the
due process or equal protection glauses of both the federal and
state constitutions.4
The doctrine, though, of liability without fault was not unknown to the common law, and it is not now a stranger to modem
legal philosophy. Absolute liability for any damage was formerly
placed upon the keeper not only of wild animals, but of domestic
animals, and upon the possessor of fire. While modem cases have
in some instances repudiated this doetrine,7 others have extended
it," some even going so far as to achieve statutory approval of the
conception of liability without fault. States can and have imposed
absolute liability on municipalities for damage to property resulting from mob violence, 9 on owners of motor vehicles for injuries
resulting from negligent operation by the person who used it with
the owners' consent,10 on owners of stock for depredations com41ves v. South Buffalo By., 210 N. Y. 271, 94 N. E. 431 (1911); Kentucky
State Journal Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Board, 161 Ky. 562, 170 S.W.
437 (1914).
5 HOLmES, THE CommoN LAw (1881); ROTTSOHAEFER, CONSMUTIONAL
L&w (1939) § 251.
6 HARPER ON ToRTs (1933) §§ 156, 166, 195. Pertinent in this connection Is
the case of Rylands v. Fletcher, L. R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866). There the defendant
constructed a large reservoir on the site of an abandoned mine shaft. The
reservoir broke, and flooded .P's mine. "We think that the true rule of law
is, that the person who for his own purposes brings on his land and collects and
keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it at his peril,
and if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is
the natural consequence of its escape." (P. 279)
7 Watts v. Norfolk & W. R. R., 39 W. Va. 196, 19 S.E. 521 (1894) ; Veith
v. Hope Salt & Coal Co., 51 W. Va. 96, 41 S.E. 187 (1902); Vaughan v. Miller
Bros. "101" Ranch Wild West Show, 109 W. Va. 170, 153 S.E.289 (1930).
8 Wilson v. Phoenix Powder Mfg. Co., 40 W. Va. 413, 21 S. . 1035
(1895) ; Sullivan v. Dunham, 161 N. Y. 290, 55 N. E. 923 (1900) ; Aggleson V.
Kendall, 92 W. Va. 138, 114 S.E.454 (1922); Ambrose v. Young, 100 W. Vs.
452, 130 S.E. 810 (1925).
9 Chicago v. Sturges, 222 U. S.313, 32 S.Ct. 92, 56 L. Ed. 215 (1911). West
Virginia by statute [W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 61, art. 6, § 12] imposes
liability on any county in which a person charged with a crime is taken from
the officer and lynched. Whether or not by this statute absolute liability has
been imposed, and whether or not such absolute liability would be held constitutional has apparently not yet been decided. Cf. Mullins v. County Court
of Greenbrier County, 112 W. Va. 593, 166 S.E. 116 (1932) ; Meadows v. City
of Logan, 1 S.E. (2d) 394 (W. Va. 1939).
o Hodge Drive-it-Yourself Co. v. Cincinnati, 284 U. S. 335, 52 S.Ct. 144,
76 L. Ed. 323 (1932).
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mitted,"' on corporations and stockholders for the acts of the officers,1 2 and on railroads for the damage to property injured or

destroyed by fire communicated directly or indirectly by its engines.13 These are all indicative of the modern belief in the validity
of the imposition of liability without fault whenever it is a reasonable means for promoting a legitimate governmental policy.
The development of the workmen's compensation acts first saw
an acceptance of the elective acts which deprived a nonsubscriber
of his common-law defenses, 14 and also made the subscriber liable
without fault. Though these acts were first upheld upon contractual principles, they were later justified on the basis of the
police power of the state.'5 More hesitancy was evidenced in sustaining compulsory acts, but these too were soon recognized as being within the regulatory powers of the legislature.0 Our court
has recognized that a nonsubseriber may be deprived of his common-law defenses,' 7 but has refused to take the next step - the
imposition of liability without fault.
The basis for such a refusal may be predicated upon the belief
that such liability can be imposed only by administrative ruling
and not by judicial decision. While administration of such acts
by the courts is neither efficient'nor desirable,' several states have
adhered to this system,'" but others who have tried it have found
it unworkable.20 Furthermore, under compulsory acts, it has been
held that a defaulter may be sued at law or under the act, which11W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 19, art. 18, § 2. Haigh v. Bell, 41 W. Va.
19, 23 S. E. 666 (1895).
12 N. Y. Central R. R. v. United States, 212 U. S. 481, 29 Ct. 304, 53 L. Ed.
613 (1909).
1 St. Louis & San Francisco Ry. v. Mathews, 165 U. S. 1, 17 S. Ct. 243, 41 L.
Ed. 611 (1897).
14 Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U. S. 210, 37 S. Ct. 255, 61 L. Ed. 678 (1916);
Bell v. Toluca Coal Co., 272 Ill. 576, 112 N. E. 311 (1916); Jeffrey Mfg. Co. v.
Blagg, 235 U. S. 571, 35 S. Ct. 167, 59 L. Ed. 364 (1914); Dooley v. Sullivan,
218 Mass. 597, 106 N. E. 604 (1914); Note (1911) 24 HARV. L. REv. 647
(1911).
1; Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v. ndustrial Comm., 32 Ariz. 275, 257
Pac. 644 (1927).
20 State v. Watland, 51 N. D. 710, 201 N. W. 680 (1924) ; Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219, 37 S. Ct. 260, 61 L. Ed. 685 (1917);
Arizona Employers' Liability Cases, 250 U. S. 400, 39 S. Ct. 553, 63 L. Ed.
1058 (1918).
17De Francesco v. Piney Mining Co., 76 W. Va, 756, 86 S. E. 777 (1915);
Watts v. Ohio Valley Electric Ry., 78 W. Va. 144, 88 S. E. 659 (1916).
18 DODD, ADMINISTRAT10N OF W OKMEN'S COMPENSATIOIN (1936) c. IV.
19 DODD, ADMINISTRATION OF WORKEN'S COMPENSATION lists the following:
Wyoming, New Hampshire, New Mexieo, Alabama, Tennessee and Louisiana.
20 DODD, ADiNIS=R ToN OF WoRxmEN s COMPEN sATION lists the following:
New Jersey, Minnesota, Kansas and Nebraska.
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ever the injured employee desires. 21 If he decides to sue at law,
it tias been held constitutional to hold the employer liable without
fault for the injury sustaine& 22 The express ground of decision of
the principal case would thus seem to be at variance with these
cases as to the right to provide for judicially imposed iability without fault for nonsubseribing employers as an incident to a coordinated compensation system.
If recognition isonce accorded to the fact that it is within the
limits of the due process clauses to deprive a subscribing or nonsubscribing employer of his common-law defenses, to make a subscriber liable without fault under both the compulsory and elective
acts, at law or before the administrative body or officer and to impose a compulsory act upon all employers, it would seem no great
departure to take the further step and impose absolute liability
upon a nonsubscribing employer. It is not a matter of punishing
the employer, since he is not engaging in blameworthy conduct but he is creating hazards, necessary though they may be to society. Notions of fairness cannot require that the risk should fall
on the employee, and it is submitted, that since the employer can
readily escape liability by electing to accept the provisions of the
compensation act, it is neither arbitrary, nor counter to any conception of fairness to impose upon a nonsubscriber absolute liability.28
A. A. A.
CountEAng- POWER OF CH&nCERY TO PuNISH. - An attorney
for the special receiver of the defendant coal company filed an
answer to an order by the court directing him to pay a certain
sum to the receiver, averring that he had paid the sum. The receiver's receipt showed such a payment. On examination it was
found that the answer had been drafted in anticipation of a payment which had never been made. Both the attorney and the receiver were found guilty of contempt of court. The question was
21 Fabler v. City of Minot, 49 N. D. 960, 194 N. W. 695 (1923).
22 Fabiler v. City of Minot, 49 N. D. 960, 194 N. W. 695 (1923); State of
North Dakota v. Watland, 51 N. D. 710, 201 N. W. 680 (1924).
231,,... we cannot assent to the proposition that the rights of life, liberty,
and property guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment prevent the States
from modifying that rule of the common law which requires or permits the
workingman to take the chances in such a lottery.), Arizona EmployersLiability Cases, 250 U. S. 400, 423-424, 39 S. Ct. 553, 63 L. lEd. 1058 (1918).
"The common law system of rights and remedies as it existed at the time of
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution did hot
thereby acquire a perpetual guarantee against change by legislative processes."
0moNAL
L&w 547 (1939).
RosTsoaAEFPE, CoNsTr
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